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To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a 
mandatory system but to help savers, it adds tax-favored retirement accounts.   
In a very simple model, where benefits are proportional to contributions,   
we compare three extreme systems: (i) the pure mandatory system,   
(ii) the asymmetric system, where only the savers participate in the voluntary system, 
(iii) the symmetric system, where both types participate proportionally to their 
wages. The symmetric voluntary system is welfare-superior to the asymmetric one as 
well as to the pure mandatory system, which in turn are equivalent to each other.  
 
 









Az önkéntes nyugdíjrendszer  
egy egyszerű modellje  




A rövidlátó dolgozókat a kormányzat úgy tudja saját maguk ellen megvédeni, hogy 
kötelező nyugdíjrendszert vezet be. De a takarékos dolgozók érdekében egy önkéntes 
nyugdíjrendszerrel egészíti ki a kötelező rendszert. Egy nagyon egyszerű modellben, 
amelyben mindkét rendszer nyugdíjai arányosak a befizetésekkel, három szélsőséges 
rendszert hasonlítunk össze: 1. a tisztán kötelező rendszert; 2. az aszimmetrikus 
rendszert, ahol csak a takarékosak vesznek részt az önkéntes rendszerben;   
3. a szimmetrikus rendszert, amelyben mindkét típus tagjai a keresetükkel arányosan 
vesz részt a rendszerben. A társadalmi jóléti függvényt tekintve a szimmetrikus 
önkéntes rendszer egyaránt felülmúlja a tiszta kötelező és az aszimmetrikus önkéntes 
rendszert, amelyek viszont nagyjából ekvivalensek. 
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To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a proportional
mandatory system. But to help savers, it adds tax-favored retirement accounts, with
proportional matching. In a very simple model, we compare three extreme systems: (i)
the pure mandatory system, (ii) the asymmetric system, where only the savers partici-
pate in the voluntary system, (iii) the symmetric system, where both types participate
proportionally to their wages. The symmetric voluntary system is welfare-superior to
the asymmetric one as well as to the pure mandatory system, which in turn are close
to each other.
JEL code: H55, D91
Key words: mandatory pensions, tax-favored retirement accounts, voluntary contri-
butions, subsidies.
ii1. Introduction
In most developed countries, in addition to the mandatory (funded and/or unfunded,
public or private) pension system, a voluntary pension system exists, providing tax
and contribution subsidies. The voluntary pension system is formed by tax-favored
retirement accounts. In the default case, these subsidized savings cannot be withdrawn
until the owner retires. The proponents of such systems justify these subsidies like
this: a mandatory system does not and need not ensure high enough pensions, and
the mostly partially myopic (for short, myopic) workers must be made interested in
raising their old-age incomes through a voluntary system. The opponents are afraid
that these subsidies are poorly targeted, mostly subsidize the well-paid savers, while
worsening the burden of the others by increasing the tax expenditures. Up to now these
tax expenditures have generally been quite low, thus they may be neglected, but under
a possible contraction of the mandatory system they may become much higher. In this
paper, we will discuss the issue in a very simple model. Since there are no other taxes
in the model, we will write earmarked taxes rather than tax expenditures, pretending
that a special tax ¯nances the subsidies. Following Feldstein (1987, Part I), we consider
only two types: the myope (L) with a low discount factor and the saver (H) with a high
discount factor. (In fact, with Feldstein, the myopes are fully myope and the savers are
fully savers with discount factors 0 and 1, respectively.) To enhance the realism of the
model, we introduce wage heterogeneity as well. To avoid having four types, we assume
that the myopes' earning is less than or equal to the savers'.
We consider three simple systems consisting of di®erent combinations of pillars:
(i) the pure mandatory system, without voluntary pillar but with forced savings for the
myopes; (ii) the sum of a mandatory pillar and the asymmetric voluntary pillar, with
only the savers's participations; (iii) the sum of a mandatory pillar and the symmetric
voluntary pillar, with both types participating proportionally to their wages. Without
confusion, in case (ii) and (iii), we shall speak of asymmetric or symmetric voluntary
system, respectively. Assuming that in both pension pillars, the bene¯ts are propor-
tional to contributions, the individually optimal decisions are easy to calculate, opening
the door for further investigation. We posited a utilitarian social welfare, without dis-
counting future utility (cf. Feldstein, 1987). Our main numerical results are as follows:
The symmetric voluntary system is superior to the asymmetric one as well as to the
pure mandatory system, which in turn are close to each other.
Starting with the Hungarian experiences, it should be emphasized that the newly
granted bene¯ts in the Hungarian mandatory pillar are almost proportional to the
contributions, it is quite generous, replacing about 60{70% of the lifetime net wages, up
to the triple of the average wage. In addition, the voluntary pillar is also generous: the
current ceiling (on the sum of employee's and employer's contributions) is about 30% of
the average gross wage and the matching rate varies between 30{50%. Nevertheless, the
participation is quite modest, about 1/3 of the work force, while the average voluntary
contribution is about 3.6% of the average wage. This is especially low if dormant
accounts are taken into account (Matits, 2008). Our tentative results support those who
criticize the Hungarian voluntary pillar for having too high ceilings and concentrated
subsidies.
Turning to the international experience, let us underline that most pension systems
deviate from the Hungarian system in a very important dimension: the mandatory or
1the voluntary pillar is progressive. For example, the US and the Czech mandatory
pillars as well as the German and the Czech voluntary pillars are progressive. A proper
evaluation of such systems needs modi¯ed models.
Among the large number of US studies, we single out the following ones: Poterba
et al. (1996) estimate that the introduction of tax-favored retirement accounts signi¯-
cantly increased total savings, while Engen et al. (1996) ¯nd the opposite. Trying at a
synthesis, Hubbard and Skinner (1996) guess that both trends are present but the pos-
itive trend outweighs the negative. Note that all the three studies identify savings and
social welfare; further, concentrate on the former rather than on the latter. Bernheim
(1999) gives an excellent survey on the topic. Love (2007) analyzes the impact of the
age, the matching rate, the vesting policies and the withdrawal penalties on the partici-
pation rate. Baily and Kirkegaard (2009, p. 10) emphasize that \[t]the value of the tax
breaks given to pensioners is very high in the US ... 1% of the GDP." BÄ orsch-Supan
et al. (2008) study the reform of the German system. OECD (2005) provides a useful
overview.
Modeling the much more complex British system, Sefton et al. (2008) ask the
following question: what is the impact of the introduction of pension credit on other
pension savings? According to their model, there was only a small increase, because
the increase in the pension savings of the lower-paid induced by the pension credit was
almost counterbalanced by the decrease in the pension savings of the higher-paid.
Even more complex models are used by Imrohoro¸ glu et al. (1998) and Fehr et
al. (2008). The latter emphasize the uncertainty of earning paths and longevity, and
quantify the reduced quality of insurance following the setting up voluntary pension
pillar. Admitting the virtues of these complex models, we still hope that our toy model
has its own advantage of being simple.
A theoretical paper of Homburg (2006) considers the problem of rational prodigals,
and argues for wage taxes and saving subsidies as a second-best solution.
The papers mentioned above follow an orthodox approach, because they heavily
rely on time-consistency: as there is no new information, the workers do not change
their saving behavior with the passage of time. The present paper also belongs to this
group, it only deviates from orthodoxy by eliminating subjective discounting in the
social welfare function.
Less orthodox models (e.g. Laibson, 1998; Diamond and K} oszegi, 2003) employ the
hyperbolic discounting when explaining and evaluating the voluntary pension pillar. To
give a simple example: some workers plans to pay monthly voluntary contributions of 10
units during 480 months to get additional pension bene¯t of 20 units during 240 months.
But he immediately realizes that if he skips the ¯rst month voluntary contribution, then
his monthly bene¯t is only reduced by 0.046 units, therefore he may safely skip the ¯rst
month. But what happens if he goes on in the second, third etc. month?
Using behavioral economics, Choi et al. (2004) also ¯nd a quite unorthodox behav-
ior: if the default option is changed, and the new employees are automatically enrolled
into a pension fund, from which they can opt-out, then a much higher share will stay
in the voluntary pillar than in the original default. Saez (2009, pp. 204{205) proves
experimentally that \details matter ... [in] the take-up of ¯nancial incentives for retire-
ment saving." For example, \increasing the e®ective match rate in the federal saver's
credit from 25 percent to 100 percent raised take up by at most 1.3 percentage points."
2Even the form of package matters. \[A] randomly selected subset of the treatment
group members was presented with a 33 percent credit rebate (cash back) rather than
a 50 percent match. While these two subsidies are economically equivalent, previous
experiments ... have shown that a match presentation generates a higher take-up than
a credit presentation." Being partial equilibrium models, the latter models neglect the
tax burden of such schemes.
The structure of the remainder of the present paper is as follows: 2. The model
framework. 3. Analytical results. 4. Numerical illustrations. 5. Conclusions.
2. The model framework
In this Section, we outline the model framework. First we determine the optimal vol-
untary contributions and savings chosen by the individual workers, then we de¯ne the
welfare provided by various mandatory and voluntary systems.
Maximizing individual utility
We shall make the following extreme, nevertheless meaningful assumptions. The popu-
lation and the economy are stationary, traditional saving does not yield interest. Every
young-aged individual works and every old-aged individual is retired. Every worker is
employed for a unit time period and every pensioner enjoys his retirement for a period
of length ¹, 0 < ¹ < 1. (In practice, the more one earns, the longer he lives on aver-
age; and the retirement age depends on the pension system, but here we neglect these
relations.) Most existing systems super°uously di®erentiate between employer's and
employee's mandatory contributions, but we assume a uni¯ed mandatory contribution.
Contrary to practice, we prefer the total wage cost w to gross wages (their di®erence
is the employer's contribution) and we calculate on its basis. Thus we assume that a
worker with wage w pays a positive mandatory contribution ¿w, at least up to a ceiling
wx > 0. (The ceiling on the mandatory contributions ¿wx will not play any role in this
paper, but we display it, to stress its importance in reality, namely the higher the ceil-
ing on mandatory contributions, the lower is the socially optimal ceiling on voluntary
contributions.) In addition, the worker with wage w pays an earmarked tax µw into the
budget, ¯nancing the voluntary pensions.
In addition to his wage, the worker has another parameter called discount factor: ±,
0 < ± · 1. We assume that some type (w;±) prefers additional bene¯ts over the manda-
tory ones, therefore he pays a voluntary contribution r over the mandatory contribution,
where r 2 [0; rx], and rx ¸ 0 is the ceiling on voluntary contribution. The government
matches the voluntary contribution r according to a matching{voluntary contribution
function a(r). As was cited from Saez in the Introduction, this form is economically
equivalent to the credit rebate. (Indeed, if the government immediately returns a from
the extended voluntary contribution r, then this is equivalent to another system, where
the voluntary contribution is only r ¡ a but the government adds matching a to the
account.)
The pension paid as a life annuity consists of two terms: the earnings-related manda-
tory bene¯t b(w) and the voluntary pension [r+a(r)]=¹. (As a matter of fact, voluntary
3pensions are seldom paid as life annuity, but this is irrelevant here, because we do not
discuss the distribution of consumption within the retirement period.)
Finally, there may exist types for whom even the maximal voluntary contribution rx
and the corresponding maximal subsidy ax are insu±cient. These types can traditionally
save an additional sum, denoted by s ¸ 0. We assume that the e±ciency of this
traditional saving is the same as that of the mandatory pillar, i.e. the corresponding
life annuity is s=¹. Note that for an optimizing individual, s > 0 implies r = rx!
The (intensity of) consumption of a worker and of a pensioner are, respectively
c = w ¡ ¿w ¡ µw ¡ r ¡ s and d = b(w) + [r + a(r) + s]=¹:
(Both c and d are positive. Of course, the old-age consumption d means a lifetime
pensioner consumption ¹d.)
We turn to the individual optimization. The subjective lifetime utility function of
type (w;±) consists of two terms: (i) the utility u(¢) of worker consumption c and (ii)
the utility ¹±u(d) of the pensioner's consumption d. Here ± is the discount factor. In
sum:
^ Z(w;±;c;d) = u(c) + ¹±u(d):
The individual determines the pair (voluntary contribution, saving) [r(w;±);s(w;±)]
by maximizing his lifetime utility ^ Z(w;±;c;d) under the lifetime budget constraint.
Partly for the sake of simplicity, partly for bounded rationality, we assume that each
worker takes the earmarked tax rate as given, i.e. does not consider the indirect impact
of his or others' choices. Substituting the consumption equations into ^ Z, provides the
subjective utility in another form:
Z(w;±;r;s) = u(w ¡ ¿w ¡ µw ¡ r ¡ s) + ¹±u(b(w) + [r + a(r) + s]=¹):
The worker determines his optimal voluntary contribution ~ r and saving ~ s by taking the
partial derivatives with respect to decisions r and s. (To avoid lengthy notations, we
shall rarely use tilde for the optimum.) We must take into account the possibility of
corner solutions. We assume that b(w) and a(r) are increasing concave functions, at
least in the intervals wm · w · wx and 0 · r · rx, respectively, where wm is the
minimal wage. Moreover, b(0) ¸ 0 and a(0) = 0. To minimize the number of cases, for
the time being, we assume that b(w) and a(r) are smooth functions. Here are the cases
to be distinguished:
Zero voluntary contribution, zero saving, r = 0, s = 0:
Z0
r(w;±;0;0) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d)[1 + a0(0)] · 0:
Positive voluntary contribution below ceiling, zero saving, 0 < r < rx, s = 0:
Z0
r(w;±;r;0) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d)[1 + a0(r)] = 0:
Maximal voluntary contribution, zero saving, r = rx, s = 0:
Z0
s(w;±;rx;0) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d) · 0:
Maximal voluntary contribution, positive saving, r = rx, s > 0:
Z0
s(w;±;rx;s) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d) = 0:
4Macro framework
In our model, workers have two characteristics: w and ±. We assume that their joint
probability distribution is given by (fi)I
i=1 (possibly i = (j;k)) on the grid-points of the
rectangle wm · w · wx and ±m · ± · ±x.
We assume that the government operates uniform contribution and tax rates ¿ and
µ, where total mandatory contributions cover the total mandatory pension expenditures,
while the earmarked taxes ¯nance the subsidies. In formula:
Balance of the mandatory pensions
I X
i=1
fi[¿wi ¡ ¹b(wi)] = 0:
Balance of the voluntary transfers
I X
i=1
fi[µwi ¡ a(r(wi;±i))] = 0;
where Ti = a(r(wi;±i)) ¡ µwi is the voluntary transfer received by type i. We also need
the total savings, i.e. the aggregate traditional savings plus the aggregate voluntary




fi[s(wi;±i) + r(wi;±i) + a(r(wi;±i))]:
Social welfare function
We also assume that the country is managed by a benevolent government which selects
among various systems as to maximize an appropriately de¯ned social welfare func-
tion. First of all, it removes discounting, and replaces subjective with objective utility
functions:
U(wi;±i;ci;di) = u(ci) + ¹u(di):
(Note that U is independent of ±i but to signal the second characteristic of the individual
in aggregation, we still keep ±i.)
The utilitarian social welfare function is the average of the individual objective utility




fiU(wi;±i;~ ci; ~ di):
If the government has a more egalitarian preference, it can choose a strictly concave




fiÃ(U(wi;±i;~ ci; ~ di)):
The government looks for a mandatory contribution rate ¿, an earmarked tax rate
µ, and a pair of bene¯t and matching functions b(¢);a(¢), which maximize the social
welfare function under the budget constraints or more modestly, it selects among various
systems on the basis of social welfare.
53. Analytical results
In this Section we shall outline some preliminaries, and then compare three systems
mentioned in the Introduction: (i) the pure mandatory system, (ii) the asymmetric
system, where only the savers participate in the voluntary pillar, (iii) the symmetric
system, where both types' contribution rates are equal.
Preliminaries
We shall work with homogeneous linear bene¯t and matching functions with ceilings.
Bounded homogeneous linear bene¯t{wage-function
b(w) = ¯ min(w;wx);
where ¯ > 0 is the gross replacement ratio.
Bounded homogeneous linear matching{voluntary contribution function
a(r) = ®min(r; rx);
where rx is the voluntary contribution's ceiling, ® is the matching rate, ax = ®rx is the
subsidy's ceiling. Then a(r) = min(®r; ax).
In the continuation, it is useful to apply a simple utility function, namely CRRA:
u(c) = ¾¡1c¾, where ¾ < 0. As a special limiting case (¾ = 0), Cobb{Douglas: u(c) =
logc can also be very useful.
Since u0(c) = c¾¡1, therefore for the interior optimal consumption pair with match-
ing, we have
c¾¡1 = ±(1 + ®)d¾¡1; i:e: d = [±(1 + ®)]1=(1¡¾)c:
We shall need the ratio of the optimal old- and young-age consumption:
°(±;®) = [±(1 + ®)]1=(1¡¾):
With this notation, the optimum condition reduces to
d = °(±;®)c with s ¸ 0
and
d ¸ °(±;®)c with s = 0:
For the homogeneous linear case (without ceilings), the balance equations are also
simple: for example, ¹¯ = ¿.
As a start, we shall ¯rst analyze the pure mandatory pension system (unaccompanied
by a voluntary pension pillar). We shall use notation x+ for the positive part of the
real number x: x+ = x if x ¸ 0, 0 otherwise.
6Theorem 1. A mean discount factor ±o in a pure mandatory pension system implies












¹[°(±;0) ¡ °(±o;0)]+ w
(1 + ¹°(±o;0))(1 + ¹°(±;0))
:
Proof. It is obvious that mandatory saving is d=¹, i.e. denoting the mandatory
saving ratio by ¿, the government can be represented by a discount factor ±o < 1. If
needed, we shall write ¿ = ¿(±o). We could also write ¿o = ¿(±o), but it would be
cumbersome.
The type (w;±) will then choose the subjectively optimal consumption pair and
traditional saving given above. (For discount factors lower than the mean, there would
be no traditional saving at all.)











If the mandatory contribution rate is too high, implying little or no traditional saving,
then the workers may restrain their labor supply or underreport their actual earnings.
If the mandatory contribution rate is too low, then workers with low discount factor
will have unacceptably low old-age consumption. As a compromise, the government
sets a medium mandatory contribution rate and introduces a voluntary pension pillar,
the subsidy of which is ¯nanced by an earmarked tax rate µ, which covers the resulting
subsidies: µ ¹ w = ®¹ r, where average wage is ¹ w. The government's hope is that at least
some type will increase its total saving.
From now on we give up the assumption of pure mandatory system.
Inserting the consumption functions into the optimality conditions, after rearrange-
ment, for any given µ, we obtain an optimum for each case. Four cases are to be
distinguished.
Theorem 2. For any given earmarked tax rate µ, the optimal solutions are classi¯ed
as follows:
Zero voluntary contribution, zero saving if
¯ > °(±;®)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ):
Positive voluntary contribution, zero saving:
r =
°(±;®)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) ¡ ¯
°(±;®) + ¹¡1(1 + ®)
w:
7Maximal voluntary contribution, zero saving
°(±;0)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) ¡ ¯
°(±;0) + ¹¡1 w · rx <
°(±;®)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) ¡ ¯
°(±;®) + ¹¡1(1 + ®)
w;
Maximal voluntary contribution, positive saving
r = rx and s =
°(±;0)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)w ¡ ¯w ¡ [°(±;0) + ¹¡1(1 + ®)]rx
°(±;0) + ¹¡1 :
Proof. We discuss the four cases one after the other.
(i) Inserting equations d = ¯w and c = (1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)w into inequality d > °(±;®)c,
yields
d = ¯w > °(±;®)(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)w:
determining domain 1 in the (w;±)-plane, regardless of the wage.
(ii) Inserting equations d = ¯w+(1+®)r=¹ and c = (1¡¿¡µ)w¡r into d = °(±;®)c,
yields the optimal voluntary contribution, assuming 0 · r · rx, de¯ning domain 2,
depending on the wage.
(iii) Inserting the equations into the inequality yields °(±;0)c · d < °(±;®)c, de¯ning
domain 3.
(iv) Inserting equations d = ¯w+[(1+®)rx+s]=¹ and c = (1¡¿ ¡µ)w¡rx¡s into
equation d = °(±;0)c, yields the optimal saving. We must require s ¸ 0, otherwise the
worker would pay his voluntary contribution from credit. We have obtained domain 4.
Three systems
To compare the three pension systems (i){(iii), we con¯ne the in-depth analysis to the
two-type case. Notation of types: L and H, relative frequencies fL and fH, wages wL
and wH, and pensions bL = ¯wL and bH = ¯wH and with increasing discount factors:
0 < ±L < ±H < 1. We shall call the types myope (L) and saver (H). Since in real life,
typically the myopes' earning is less than or equal to the savers', we assume wL · wH.
As a normalization, we also assume that the average wage is unity: fLwL +fHwH = 1.
We assume that the government chooses its discount factor between the two types':
±L < ±o < ±H.
Pure mandatory system: ® = 0
We reformulate Theorem 1 for the two-type case.
Theorem 1.* The optimal consumption pair and the traditional saving in the

















(1 + ¹°(±o;0))(1 + ¹°(±H;0))
:
8Since dL is too low, the government sets up tax-favored pension funds with a match-
ing rate ® > 0, and ceiling rx > 0 on the voluntary contributions. Rather than consider-
ing all the possibilities, we shall only discuss two special cases, to be called asymmetric
and symmetric voluntary systems.
Asymmetric system
To simplify the calculations, ¯rst we assume that the matching rate ® is so low or the
mean discount factor ±o is so high that the myopes do not participate at the voluntary
pensions: ±L(1 + ®) · ±o: asymmetric system.
There is another practical constraint: the savers do not pay too high voluntary
contribution, i.e. their young-age consumption is higher than their old-age consumption:
cH ¸ dH, i.e. ±H(1 + ®) · 1. On the other hand, since ±o < ±H, the savers always
contribute to the voluntary pillar. Let us assume that the ceiling is so high that the
savers' voluntary contribution is lower than the ceiling: 0 < rH < rx, i.e. sH = 0. We
formulate
Theorem 3. If the mean discount factor is high enough: ±L(1 + ®) · ±o and the
ceiling rx is high enough:
rx > rH(±o) =
[°(±H;®)(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ ¹¡1¿]wH
°(±H;®)(1 + fH®wH) + (1 + ®)¹¡1;
then H's optimal voluntary contribution rH is equal to rH(±o), while sH = 0.
Proof. The interior optimality condition holds for H: dH = °(±H;®)cH.
Then the earmarked tax balance is very simple: µ = fH®rH. Therefore cH =
(1 ¡ ¿)wH ¡ (1 + ®fHwH)rH and dH = ¯wH + (1 + ®)rH=¹. Substituting cH and dH
into H's optimum condition:
¯wH + (1 + ®)rH=¹ = °(±H;®)[(1 ¡ ¿)wH ¡ (1 + fH®wH)rH]:
After rearrangement, we have the voluntary contribution.
Remark. It is obvious that the bill of savers' `perfection' is partly paid by the my-









Typically the welfare provided by the asymmetric voluntary system is close to that
of the pure mandatory one.
Symmetric system
Before discussing the third system, let us introduce type i's voluntary contribution rate
½i: ri = ½iwi, i = L;H.
In comparison to the asymmetric system, it seems to be more appropriate if the
government sets such a low ceiling and such a high matching rate that both voluntary
contribution rates are equal: ½L = ½H = ½ and H's voluntary contribution reaches the
ceiling: ½wH = rx. We shall call this system symmetric.
9Theorem 4. a) If the matching rate is moderate: (1 + ®)±H · 1 and the mean
discount factor ±o is also moderate:
±L · ±o · ±0 = (1 + ®)±L;
then the optimal voluntary contribution ratio is equal to
½(¿) =
°(±L;®)




and the voluntary contribution's ceiling is reached: rx = ½(¿)wH = rH, while H's





°(±H;0) + ¹¡1 ¡ ¿ ¡ (1 + ®)½(¿)
b) For a moderate ¯xed contribution rate (see in Corollary 1), the symmetric system
is welfare-superior to the pure mandatory system.
Proof. a) In the symmetric system, µ = ®½, hence L's optimum condition
¹¡1[¿ + (1 + ®)½] = °(±L;®)[1 ¡ ¿ ¡ (1 + ®)½]
yields the optimal voluntary contribution rate, which in turn yields the ceiling on vol-
untary contributions.
To determine H's traditional saving, substitution into dH = °(±H;0)cH yields
¹¡1f[¿ + (1 + ®)½]wH + sHg = °(±H;0)f[1 ¡ ¿ ¡ (1 + ®)½]wH ¡ sHg:
Solving for sH=wH, gives the result.
b) The optimal solution of type H is the same in the symmetric voluntary system as in
the pure mandatory system, because the earmarked tax and the voluntary contribution
are ¯nanced from the reduction of traditional savings. The optimal solution of type L
in the former consists of higher old-age consumption and lower young-age consumption
than does the latter, but preserving their order and the their weighted sum. Thus
the objective utility of the symmetric voluntary system is higher than that of the pure
mandatory one.
We continue with
Conjecture 1. For a su±ciently low mean discount factor ±o, the asymmetric vol-
untary system provides a social welfare close to the pure mandatory one's.
Finally, we formulate an interesting corollary to Theorem 2, which outlines the equiv-
alence between various combinations of mandatory and symmetric voluntary systems.
Let ¿0 correspond to ±0 (pure mandatory system) and let ¿L stand for the minimal
mandatory contribution rate consistent with nonnegative traditional saving intensions,
for given ® and ±o.





and rx[¿] = ½[¿]wH
to the mandatory pillar provides essentially the same solution, i.e. the combinations
(¿;½[¿]) are equivalent in the interval ¿L · ¿ · ¿0.
Proof. Note that ½(¿) = ½[¿].
Remark. Contrary to Theorem 4b, here the mandatory contribution rate ¿ varies
together with the parameters of the symmetric voluntary system.
4. Numerical illustration
We continue our analysis with numerical illustrations. We assume that the time spent
at retirement is half as long as that of working: ¹ = 0:5 and the CRRA parameter is
¾ = ¡1. Basically we follow the logic of the previous section.
For the time being, we assume that every worker has a unit total wage and we vary
the discount factor and the ceiling on mandatory contributions to study their impacts.
As a baseline case, we calculate the optimal consumption pairs plus the mandatory
contribution rate for four corresponding discount factors. Each case has a name, two
have an abbreviations: myope (L) and saver (H), and two have a symbol: o (mean)and
government (*). Table 1 presents the optimal young- and old-age consumption and the
saving.
Table 1. Discounting and optimal consumption pair: no matching
Pension-
Discounting Worker Pensioner saving
Type factor c o n s u m p t i o n rate
i ±i ci di ¿i
Myopic (L) 0.15 0.838 0.324 0.162
Mean (o) 0.225 0.808 0.383 0.192
Saver (H) 0.5 0.739 0.522 0.261
Government (*) 1 0.667 0.667 0.333
Remark: w = 1. We display 10U + 100 rather than U.
Table 1 displays that the lower the discount factor, the higher is the worker con-
sumption and the lower is the pensioner consumption, and the corresponding saving
or mandatory contribution rate. (The value of the consumption ratio depends on the
exponent of the utility function, ¾. The higher the absolute value of ¾, the higher is
the ratio of the pensioner's consumption to the worker's.)
From now on we move on to the two-type case, with relative frequencies fL = 2=3
and fH = 1=3, wage rates wL = 1=2 and wH = 2, yielding ¹ w = 1. We assume
11di®erent discount factors ±L = 0:15, ±H = 0:5 (¯rst and third rows in Table 1). The
government chooses ± = 0:225, i.e. the corresponding medium mandatory contribution
rate is ¿ = 0:192 (second row in Table 1).
Table 2 displays a desaggregated picture. The last column contains the e±ciency
of the system in terms of the pure mandatory one, where e de¯nes the real number,
by which multiplying the wages, the modi¯ed pure mandatory system becomes welfare
equivalent to the voluntary system (either asymmetric or symmetric).
Table 2. Comparison of mandatory and voluntary pensions
Voluntary Traditi- Volun- Life-
contri- onal Worker Pensioner tary time
Earning bution saving c o n s u m p t i o n transfer utility E±ciency
wi ri si ci di Ti Ui e
Pure mandatory system (® = 0) 1
0.5 0 0 0.409 0.183 0 48.167
2.0 0 0.157 1.478 1.045 0 88.447
Asymmetric voluntary system (® = 0:5) 0.989
0.5 0 0 0.391 0.192 {0.013 48.372
2.0 0.152 0 1.413 1.224 0.02 88.840
Symmetric voluntary system (® = 1) 1.038
0.5 0.006 0 0.393 0.215 0 51.265
2.0 0.023 0.092 1.478 1.045 0 88.447
The pure mandatory system is only displayed as a benchmark, with relative e±ciency
1. Note the unacceptably low old-age consumption of the myope: dL = 0:183.
The mandatory pillar with an asymmetric voluntary pillar only makes things a
little bit worse because the matching rate is too low to help the myope (® = 0:5) and
the ceiling on voluntary contribution is high enough (rx = 0:152) to allow the saver to
appropriate the bene¯ts. The earmarked tax rate creates a net transfer from the myopes
to the savers. The young-age consumption of the former slightly diminishes, just to help
raise the savers' old-age consumptions. The pure mandatory pillar can achieve the same
social welfare as the asymmetric voluntary system with 1.1 percent lower wages.
The mandatory pillar with a symmetric voluntary pillar redresses the injustice: the
matching rate is raised to 1, while the ceiling is lowered to 0:023. Now the myope's old-
age consumption rises from dL = 0:183 to 0.215, young-age consumption drops from
cL = 0:409 to 0.393, while cH and dH remain invariant. The pure mandatory pillar can
achieve the welfare of the symmetric voluntary system by increasing wages uniformly
by 3.8 percent.
In harmony with Conjecture 1 and Theorem 4b, the social welfare provided by the
pure mandatory and asymmetric voluntary systems are close too each other, and are
dominated by the symmetric voluntary system.
Finally, in the interval 0:15 · ±o · 0:3, de¯ning ¿(±o), ½(¿) decreases, while the
outcome remains the same.
125. Conclusions
We have constructed a simple overlapping generations model, where in addition to
the proportional (contributive) mandatory system, there is a tax-favored proportional
retirement pillar, ¯nanced from earmarked taxes. The voluntary contribution and the
traditional saving are determined by the workers maximizing their subjective utility
functions, while the corresponding earmarked tax rate and the ceiling on voluntary
contributions are calculated by the government. In our \general equilibrium" model, we
have done the ¯rst theoretical and numerical calculations. The proportional tax-favored
pillar with high ceiling and low matching (resembling Hungary) is poorly targeted, when
the mandatory pillar is also proportional and generous: it helps just those who do not
need this help, asymmetry. It is socially more attractive to diminish radically the
ceiling and enhance the matching: symmetry. The results seem to be acceptable but
a lot of further analytical arguments and numerical trials are needed to con¯rm our
tentative deductions. For progressive mandatory or voluntary pillars, the evaluation
will be di®erent. Further complications arise if behavioral anomalies are taken into
account.
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